UIC Law Review
Volume 14

Issue 1

Article 9

Fall 1980

Petrie v. Illinois High School Association: Gender Classification
and High School Athletics, 14 J. Marshall L. Rev. 227 (1980)
Diane I. Jennings

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the
Fourteenth Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
Diane I. Jennings, Petrie v. Illinois High School Association: Gender Classification and High School
Athletics, 14 J. Marshall L. Rev. 227 (1980)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol14/iss1/9
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

PETRIE V. ILLINOIS HIGH SCHOOL
ASSOCIA TION:*
GENDER CLASSIFICATION AND HIGH SCHOOL
ATHLETICS
During the past decade numerous courts have struck down
rules prohibiting girls from playing on boys' teams in public
school athletic programs.' In one of the first challenges 2 to the
inevitable converse situation 3 the Illinois Appellate Court held
in Petrie v. Illinois High School Association4 that preventing
boys from playing on girls' volleyball teams is constitutionally
permissible. Indeed, this decision indicates that a rule prohibit5
ing male players on any girls' team would be constitutional.
FACTS

Trent Petrie was a 16-year-old high school junior, 5'11" in
height and 170 lbs. in weight. He reported for, and was practicing with, the girls' volleyball team when school officials informed him that he could not play in interscholastic
* 75 Ill. App. 3d 980, 394 N.E.2d 855 (1979).
1. E.g., Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir.
1973) (high school athletic association rule prohibiting girls from engaging
with boys in interscholastic athletic contests held unconstitutional); Leffel
v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp. 1117 (E.D. Wis.
1978) (rule excluding girls from boys' teams unconstitutional unless girls'
teams were established); Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882
(1975) (exclusion of capable girls from boys' team violated equal protection
regardless of existence of girls' teams).
2. Only two other states, Rhode Island and Massachusetts, have considered the constitutionality of rules prohibiting boys from playing on girls'
teams. Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659 (D.
R.I.), vacated as moot, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979); Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1584, 393
N.E.2d 284 (1979). See notes 36-48 and accompanying text infra.
3. Since 1975, the U.S. Supreme Court has decided a few cases involving situations where discrimination against men was claimed. See, e.g., Orr
v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (invalidating statute allowing only women to
claim alimony after a divorce); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating statute prohibiting sale of 3.2 beer to males under 21 and females under
18); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (invalidating social security provision which denied payments to surviving widowers but authorized
payments to widows). For a discussion of these and other sex-discrimination cases, see Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Benign Classification in the
Context of Sex, 10 CoNN. L. REV. 813 (1978); Turkington, Equal Protectionof
the Laws in Illinois, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 385 (1975-76).
4. 75 Ill. App. 3d 980, 394 N.E.2d 855 (1979).
5. Id. at 992, 394 N.E.2d at 864.
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tournaments due to an Illinois High School Association rule.6
Trent's mother sought to enjoin the Association 7 from enforcing
this rule. After a hearing on the merits,8 the suit was dismissed
and this appeal followed.9
In upholding the validity of the rule, the Illinois Appellate
Court first determined the applicable standards of judicial review 1 under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment of the United States Constitution" and the equal
6. "To enter any of the tournaments a girl must be eligible under all of
the eligibility rules and conditions of the Illinois High School Association.
Only girls shall be eligible to participate in any of the tournament series
matches." Sec. VII E, 1978-79 Girls State Volleyball Series Terms and Conditions, ILLINOIS INTERSCHOLASTIC (Sept. 1978) (official publication of the Illinois High School Association) (emphasis added).
"The use of any ineligible participant in any interscholastic game or
contest shall make the forfeiture of the game or contest automatic, and
mandatory if won by the offending team." ILLINOIS HIGH SCHOOL AssocIATION BY-LAws, § 6.020 (1980).
7. The court found the status of the Illinois High School Association
unclear; however the organization conceded that, as an association of
mostly public schools, its actions were also those of the state. This question
was previously decided in Bucha v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 351 F. Supp.
69 (N.D. Ill. 1972) which held that a private, voluntary association with taxsupported public institutions was sufficient to constitute state action. Accord, Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, Inc., 377 F. Supp.
1233 (D. Kan. 1974); Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n, 341 F. Supp.
258 (D. Neb. 1972); Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic
Ass'n, Inc., 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1584, 393 N.E.2d 284 (1979). The Illinois School
Code provides for the involvement of the Illinois High School Association in
the promulgation of guidelines for athletic programs. See note 12 infra.
The suit also asked injunctive relief against the high school which, pursuant
to Illinois High School Association rules, had prevented Trent from playing
on the volleyball team. Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 Ill. App. 3d
980, 981, 394 N.E.2d 855, 856 (1979).
8. Other evidence presented at the hearing was alluded to by the Illinois Appellate Court, but not specifically set forth. There was testimony
that, in general, high school boys are substantially taller, heavier, and
stronger than high school girls. Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 Ill.
App. 3d 980, 987, 394 N.E.2d 855, 861 (1979). The defendant also presented
evidence of instances where participation by boys on a girls' team created
an advantage for that team over all-female teams. Id. at 988, 394 N.E.2d at
861.
9. The lower court agreed with the defendant that the classification,
although based on sex, was justified because it preserved, fostered, and increased athletic competition for girls and prevented unfair competition that
would arise from male dominance of the game. The plaintiff presented
three counter-arguments: (1) there was no important state interest in
avoiding imbalanced competition or male dominance; (2) the classification
was both overbroad and underbroad and used sex as a substitute as a mere
matter of convenience; and (3) it was constitutionally impermissible to
have volleyball teams and tournaments only for girls without opportunity
for participation by boys. Id. at 981, 394 N.E.2d at 857.
10. Id. at 982-83, 394 N.E.2d at 857-58.
11. The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV. Although the issue presented, and the holding in Petrie,refers
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rights provision of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.12 The court
considered cases from other jurisdictions which addressed this
issue 13 but essentially developed its own reasoning, holding that
separate teams may be provided for girls without providing a
similar program for boys. The critical factors in the court's analysis were the innate physical differences between males and females, 14 and what the court deemed to be a compelling state
15
interest in fostering athletic opportunities for girls.
to the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the standards applied by the court have been developed in relation to the equal protection
clause. The standard advocated by the dissent has been used in deciding
due process questions. See note 23 infra. The disagreement may stem from
the conceptual difficulty in separating the due process and equal protection
clauses. Federal equal protection claims are brought under the fifth amendment provision of due process of law. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973) (federal statute requiring married female Air Force officers
to prove dependency of spouse for purpose of benefits violated due process,
where same proof was not required for spouses of male Air Force officers).
The United States Supreme Court's "approach to Fifth Amendment equal
protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment." Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
12. ' The equal protection of the laws shall not be denied or abridged on
account of sex by the State or its units of local government and school districts." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 18. The Illinois Supreme Court held that, under
this article, classification based on sex was a suspect classification which, to
be held valid, had to withstand strict judicial scrutiny. The purpose of the
article was deemed to be to guarantee rights for females equal to those of
males. People v. Ellis, 57 Ill.
2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974).
The applicability of relevant parts of § 27-1 of the School Code was conceded. The court never discussed the implications of this statute, which
would seem to clearly prohibit exclusion of a boy from a girls' team. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 27-1 (1979) provides:
No student shall, solely by reason of that person's sex, be denied access
to physical education and interscholastic athletic programs or comparable programs supported from school district funds. Equal access to programs supported from school district funds and comparable programs
will be defined in guidelines promulgated by the State Board of Education in consultation with the Illinois High School Association.
13. In most of the cases considered by the Petriecourt, rules prohibiting
girls from playing on boys' teams were questioned on state or federal equal
protection grounds. See Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292
(8th Cir. 1973); Morris v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 472 F.2d 1207 (6th Cir.
1973); Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 344 F. Supp. 1117
(E.D. Wis. 1978); Gilpin v. Kansas State High School Activities Ass'n, Inc.,
377 F. Supp. 1233 (D. Kan. 1973); Reed v. Nebraska School Activities Ass'n,
341 F. Supp. 258 (D. Neb. 1972); Haas v. South Bend Community School
Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 289 N.E.2d 495 (1972); Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania
Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 45, 334 A.2d 839 (1975);
Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975).
14. Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 Ill.
App. 3d 980, 988-89, 394
N.E.2d 855, 861 (1979).
15. Id. at 990, 394 N.E.2d at 863.
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THE STANDARD OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

In the federal courts, the applicable standard of judicial review depends on whether a classification has been labeled "sus16
pect." In equal protection cases strict scrutiny is applied to
17
classifications involving a suspect class or affecting a fundamental interest, 18 and a rational basis test is applied to other
classifications. 19 Sex has not been treated as a suspect classification under the federal constitution. 20 Instead an intermediate
test for determining the validity of gender-based classifications
16. In Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court stated that when
strict scrutiny is applied, classifications must "be subjected to the 'most
rigid scrutiny,'... and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to
be necessary to the accomplishment of some permissible state objective,
independent of ... discrimination." Id. at 11, quoting Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944). In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)
the court stated that the state interest must be "compelling." Id. at 375.
Necessity to accomplish the government interest has also been stated to be
a required element. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). See generallyDevelopments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1087-1132
(1969); Comment, Compelling State Interest Test and the Equal Protection
Clause-An Analysis, 6 Ctm. L. REV. 109 (1975).
17. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage);
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (race); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (national origin).
18. In addition to traditional first amendment protections, the Court has
recognized certain other rights as so fundamental that strict scrutiny is ap-

plicable. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (procreation); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (personal privacy); Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (voting); Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel).
19. The Court explained the rational basis test in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), stating that the fourteenth amendment
is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant
to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact
that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it.
Id. at 425-26. See generally Bice, Standardsof Judicial Review Under the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, 65 CALIF. L. REv. 689, 698-702
(1977).
20. The United States Supreme Court almost declared sex a suspect
classification in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). In Frontiero,a
married female Air Force officer sought increased benefits for her husband.
The statute governing these benefits provided that female officers had to
prove that their spouses were in fact dependents in order to qualify for increased benefits. The spouses of male officers automatically qualified, with
no inquiry as to their dependency in fact. Justices Brennan, Douglas,
White, and Marshall agreed that sex was an inherently suspect classification. Id. at 682. However, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and
Blackmun, in the dissent, clearly opposed including sex in the category of
suspect classification. Id. at 691-92. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist expressed no opinion. Id. at 691. The plurality opinion rationale for considering sex classification suspect offers an interesting discussion of the history
of sex discrimination. Id. at 682-88. Later decisions have rejected suspect
classification status. See note 21 infra.
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has emerged. Under this test, to justify disparate treatment, a
regulation must "serve important governmental objectives and
must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. ' 21 The Petrie court applied this intermediate federal standard in deciding that the rule in question was valid under the
22
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
In contrast, sex has been declared a suspect classification
under the equal rights provision of the Illinois Constitution of
1970.23 Therefore, the court stated its intention to apply a standard of strict scrutiny 24 in determining the rule's validity under
the Illinois constitution. It is unclear, however, whether the
strict scrutiny test announced by the Illinois Supreme Court in
People v. Ellis,2 5 and purportedly relied on in Petrie, fully
adopts the federal strict scrutiny standard. The Ellis court addressed the need for a compelling state interest to justify disparate classifications, but did not require that the classifications be
26
necessary to accomplish that interest.
21. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). This standard has generated
much discussion since it was first enunciated in the context of genderbased discrimination in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). See note 59 infra.
The Craig decision struck down an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale
of beer to males under 21 and females under 18. The Craig Court rejected
sex as a suspect classification, but confirmed interpretation of the Reed
standard as an intermediate level of review. See generally Comment, Sex
Discrimination in Athletics: Conflicting Legislative and Judicial Approaches,29 ALA. L. REV. 390 (1978); Comment, ConstitutionalLaw: Equal
Protection Challenges to Gender-Based ClassificationsEvoke Varied Court
Responses, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 182 (1977).
22. See note 11 supra.
23. See note 12 supra.
24. The dissent in Petrieadvocated using an "irrebuttable presumption"
test, in which due process bars classification based upon a permanent presumption where individual characteristics may rebut it. Petrie v. Illinois
High School Ass'n, 75 Ill. App. 3d 980, 995, 394 N.E.2d 855, 867 (1979). This
test has been applied by the U.S. Supreme Court on numerous occasions.
See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (rules violated due process where employment restrictions on pregnant teachers
made no individualized determination of their ability to continue working);
Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (college tuition system held invalid because it did not allow individuals a fair chance to prove they were residents
of the state). See Bezanson, Some Thoughts on the Emerging Irrebuttable
PresumptionDoctrine, 7 IND. L. REV. 644 (1974). The test has been applied
in one case dealing with discrimination in high school athletics. Yellow
Springs Exempted School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High School Ass'n, 443
F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Ohio 1978). See generally Note, Sex Discriminationin
High School Athletics, 47 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 109 (1978). However, the cases in
which the test was used actually rested on an equal protection rationale.
NOwAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 497 (1978).
25. 57 Ill. 2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974).
26. In Ellis, the Illinois Supreme Court found no compelling state interest which justified treating juvenile males differently from juvenile females
in deciding at what age an individual could be tried as an adult. Id. at 133,
311 N.E.2d at 101. Since no compelling interest was found to exist, the court
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The Petrie court did not clarify this Illinois standard. After
noting that the element of necessity had not been adopted by
the Illinois Supreme Court, 27 the Petrie court held that the classification involved must be substantially or practically, 28 though
not absolutely, 29 necessary to accomplish the compelling state
interest. If the court is in fact adopting the element of necessity
as part of an Illinois strict scrutiny test, such a test is closer to
the federal intermediate test which requires that a gender-based
classification be substantiallyrelatedto achievement of the governmental interest than it is to the strict scrutiny requirement of
30
absolute necessity.
CONSIDERATION OF PRECEDENT

After determining the applicable standard, the court turned
to earlier cases dealing with sex classification in high school athletics but accorded no precedential value to recent decisions
31
It
striking down rules excluding females from all male teams.
reasoned that such decisions were based on the stigma of inferiority placed on girls as an excluded class while in Petrie boys
were more capable; thus no stigma
were excluded because they
32
of unworthiness attached.
The dismissal of these cases with little or no discussion fails
to do justice to an important line of decisions. While the undernever reached the question of whether the classification was necessary to
promote the interest.
27. Under the federal strict scrutiny standard a classification must be
shown to be necessary. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967). See note 29
infra.
28. Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 IMI.App. 3d 980, 990, 394 N.E.2d
855, 863 (1979).
29. Id. at 992, 394 N.E.2d at 865.
30. Under strict scrutiny, legislation "must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interest at stake." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
155 (1973). A classification will not be upheld under strict scrutiny if less
drastic means are available to accomplish the state purpose. Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 637 (1969).
31. See note 13 supra.
32. The Petrie dissent rejected this argument on two grounds. First,
since the decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265 (1978), freedom from discrimination applied equally to both males
and females, and if both were not accorded the same protection, then it was
not equal. Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 Ill. App. 3d 980, 995, 394
N.E.2d 855, 866 (1979). But see Scherer, Bakke Revisited, What the Court's
22
Decision Means-and Doesn't Mean, 7 HUMAN RIGHTs No. 2, p. (1978) (rejecting the argument that Bakke declared that affirmative action programs
were divisive and create a stigma for their beneficiaries). Second, the statement that boys were more capable carried the implied conclusion that females were weak and inferior. Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 Ill.
App. 3d 980, 997, 394 N.E.2d 855, 868 (1979). Accord, Comment, Title IX ofthe
1972 Education Amendments: Preventing Sex Discrimination in Public
Schools, 53 TEx. L. REV. 103 (1974).
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lying theme of these cases may well be invidious discrimination,
the decisions are much more varied and complex than the Petrie
court indicated. For example, one court 33 rejected the argument
that there were important innate physical differences between
boys and girls, citing a successful program in which girls and
boys played in mixed competition. 34 Two other cases, 35 decided
under a strict scrutiny test, held that whatever interest the state
school athletic association might advance the overriding state
interest was the equal rights amendment adopted in the state
constitution. 36 While the Petrie court might not have agreed
with this view of the paramount importance of equal rights legislation, the point was at least worthy of consideration.
Two cases discussed by the court involved virtually identical fact patterns to Petrie: Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League3 7 and Attorney General v. Massachusetts
InterscholasticAthletic Association, Inc.38 The court relied on
Gomes for its extensive discussion of the physical disadvantage
to girls in open competition 39 and dictum that discrimination between sexes, when done for a demonstrably benevolent purpose
and based on objective and accurate medical evidence, raised no
constitutional problem. 40 The Petrie court did not adequately
33. Brenden v. Independent School Dist., 477 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1973).
34. Id. at 1301, citing University of the State of New York, the State Department of Education, Division of Health, Physical Education and Recreation, Report on Experiment: Girls on Boys' InterscholasticAthletic Teams,
March 1969-June 1970 (Feb. 1972). The report stated that the only negative
factor found was "that it was not yet socially acceptable for a girl to defeat a
boy in athletic competition." Id. at 1. Furthermore, the expert opinions
solicited in preparing the report unanimously expressed the view that there
were no medical reasons to prohibit mixed competition in non-contact
sports. After a trial period, the vast majority of school personnel, student
participants and parents favored continuing the practice. Id. at 4.
35. Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 18
Pa. Commw. Ct. 45, 334 A.2d 839 (1975) (exclusion of capable girls from boys'
teams violative of equal protection regardless of existence of girls' teams);
Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975). See note 36 infra.
36. The Washington court in Darrin did not distinguish discrimination
against females and discrimination against males, indicating only that discrimination on account of sex was forbidden. "Equality of rights and responsibilities under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of
sex." WASH. CONST. art. 31, § 1. The Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted
the comparable Illinois constitutional provision to be a guarantee of rights
for females equal to those of males. See note 12 supra. This difference in
interpretation could dictate a difference in application.
37. 469 F. Supp. 659 (D. R.I.), vacated as moot, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir.
1979).
38. 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1584, 393 N.E.2d 284 (1979).
39. Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659, 662
(D. R.I.), vacated as moot, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979).
40. Id. at 663. The benevolent purpose was almost identical to that offered in Petrie: promoting athletic opportunities for girls. See note 59 infra.
The Gomes court apparently found the rule acceptable under the four-
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distinguish Gomes, which was ultimately resolved in favor of a
male student who wished to play on a girls' volleyball team.
Gomes is distinguishable, since its decision was based on the
court's interpretation of Title IX of the Education Amendments
Act of 1972.41 Although Title IX is equally applicable to Illinois
public schools it can only be assumed that the Petrie court did
not agree with the Gomes interpretation, 42 since it did not dis43
cuss the issue.
MassachusettsInterscholasticis more difficult to distinguish
than Gomes since it was decided on a state constitutional provision similar to the Illinois equal rights provision." Massachusetts Interscholastic held that the total exclusion of boys from
teams designated for girls violated equal protection. The Petrie
court failed to discuss the reasoning in MassachusettsInterscholastic, relying instead on dictum approving separate but equal

teams. 4 5 Petrie and Massachusetts Interscholastic should have
teenth amendment, despite the fact that it bestowed a benefit on females
while penalizing males.
41. Title IX provides in relevant part that, where a recipient of federal
funds under the 1972 Education Amendments
operates or sponsors a team in a particular sport for members of one
sex but operates or sponsors no such team for members of the other

sex, and athletic opportunities for members of that sex have previously
been limited, members of the excluded sex must be allowed to try-out
for the team offered unless the sport involved is a contact sport.
45 C.F.R. § 86.41(b) (1978). The regulation further provides that contact
sports include boxing, wrestling, rugby, ice hockey, football, and basketball,
as well as other sports where the major activity involves bodily contact.
The Gomes court interpreted this regulation to mean that where athletic
opportunities in a particularsport have been limited, a member of the excluded sex must be allowed to try-out. Since volleyball participation had
been limited to girls, a boy's opportunity in that sport would have been limited. Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659, 663-64
(D. R.I.), vacated as moot, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979).
42. The applicable section of Title IX regulations, note 40 supra,could
reasonably be interpreted to mean where general athletic opportunities
have been denied. This interpretation is supported by the exception of contact sports since, traditionally, it is girls and not boys who have been excluded from contact sports.
43. In stating the Gomes interpretation of Title IX, the Petrie court said:
"Although agreeing that the phrase 'athletic opportunities' used in the rule
could mean overall athletic opportunities, as the words would imply, the
[ Gomes] court stated that it was required to construe it to mean opportuni... Petrie v. Illinois High School
ties in the sport under consideration.
Ass'n, 75 Ill. 3d 980, 986, 394 N.E.2d 855, 860 (1979) (emphasis added). It is
impossible to tell whether the Petrie court means that it would interpret
the provision to mean overall athletic opportunities, or that the Gomes
court said that the words implied overall athletic opportunity, but that such
an interpretation would be unconstitutional.
44. "Equality under the law shall not be denied or abridged because of
sex, race, color, creed or national origin." MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 1.
45. Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 Ill. App. 3d 980, 987, 394 N.E.2d
855, 861 (1979).
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been compared, however, because Petrie rejected many of the
premises upon which that decision was based: (1) the Massachusetts equal rights amendment prohibited discrimination
against either sex; 46 (2) physical differences between the sexes
were not so clear or uniform as to justify a rule in which sex was
used as a substitute for functional classification such as height
or weight; 47 (3) sex classification labeled women as inherently
weak; 48 and (4) there were viable alternatives to gender-based
49
classification.
THE CouRT's REASONING

The Petrie court gave several reasons for holding the Illinois
High School Association rule valid. First, the court asserted that
the rule was consistent with the long-standing international and
national tradition of having separate teams for males and females. 50 This assertion, however, is contradicted by many of the
cases which the court rejected. 51 In addition, tradition is a poor
justification for disparate classification, when one remembers
that "separate but equal" schools were traditional until ruled
52
discriminatory by the United States Supreme Court.
46. Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n,. Inc.,
79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1584, 393 N.E.2d 284, 289 (1979). See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
47. Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc.,
79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1584, 393 N.E.2d 284, 290 (1979). See notes 52-53 and accompanying text infra.
48. Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc.,
79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1584, 393 N.E.2d 284, 294 (1979). See note 55 and accompanying text infra.
49. Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc.,
79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1584, 393 N.E.2d 284, 295 (1979). See notes 60-63 and accompanying text infra.
50. Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 Ill. App. 3d 980, 987, 394 N.E.2d
855, 861 (1979). The court cites no authority for this assertion.
51. See notes 30-35 and accompanying text supra. Given the many decisions allowing girls to participate on boys' teams, the "tradition" is already
being eroded.
52. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown, the United
States Supreme Court found that separate public schools for white and
black students were unconstitutional, even though the facilities provided
were equal. The separate but equal doctrine dates back to Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 547 (1896), where separate transportation facilities for white
and black passengers were found to be constitutional so long as they were
equal. Cases dealing with separate schools had not challenged the separate
but equal doctrine, contending only that equal education was not being provided in the particular case. E.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). The
Brown court found that separation of students, even where physical facilities were equal, placed a stigma of inferiority on the black students. This
finding rejected the doctrine of separate but equal. "Whatever may have
been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply supported by modern authority. Any language in

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 14:227

Second, the rule was upheld because there was evidence
that girls would be at a substantial disadvantage playing against
boys, which would lead to male dominance in athletics. 53 In
support of this reasoning, the court cited a statement in Gomes
that the "overwhelming majority of positions on teams open to
both sexes were held by boys. ' 54 The Petrie court, however,
failed to consider that the teams referred to in Gomes were in
traditionally male-dominated sports, and the teams were only
recently opened to girls. Thus the difference in playing ability of
the two sexes may be due to the fact that girls had not had equal
training and opportunity to participate in previously all-male

sports.
Finally, the court asserted that sex classification was consistent with the tradition in sports of setting up classifications of
players with similar physical characteristics, such as classifying
wrestlers by weight. 55 The court admitted that classification
based only on sex was both overbroad, in protecting superior female athletes, and underbroad, in excluding from protection
males less skilled in athletics than most females. 56 In United
Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected." Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95 (1954).
53. Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 Ill. App. 3d 980, 987-88, 394
N.E.2d 855, 861 (1979).
54. Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659, 661
(D. R.I.), vacated as moot, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979).
55. Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 Ill. App. 3d 980, 988, 394 N.E.2d
855, 861 (1979). This last point was used by the Petrie dissent in arguing
against any classification based on sex. Id. at 996-97, 394 N.E.2d at 867. The
dissenting judge argued that since objectively measured characteristics
were available, adopting sex as a substitute was unacceptable. 'The existence of certain characteristics to a greater degree in one sex does not justify
classification by sex rather than by the particular characteristic." Id. at 996,
394 N.E.2d at 867, citing Commonwealth v. Pennsylvania Interscholastic
Athletic Ass'n, 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 45, 52, 334 A.2d 839, 843 (1975) (exclusion
on basis of weakness or lack of skill permissible, but not on basis of sex).
See also Hoover v. Meicklejohn, 430 F. Supp. 164 (D. Colo. 1977) (arbitrary
to consider only general physiological differences without regard to individual variants within a class); accord,City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702 (1978) (impermissible to require larger pension fund contributions from
female workers based on mortality tables showing women as a rule live
longer than men).
56. Among the reasons the court gave for using sex as a substitute for
particular physical characteristics were: (1) a system based on physical
characteristics would be difficult to devise; (2) classification by gender in
sports was itself based on innate physical differences; and (3) for a school
system to provide the number of levels necessary to accommodate classification on the basis of physical characteristics would be prohibitively expensive and would deny girls the opportunity to play at the varsity level. Petrie
v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 Ill. App. 3d 980, 988-89, 394 N.E.2d 855, 862
(1979). There is, however, some indication that furtherance of economic or
administrative convenience is not a defense where classification based on
gender is concerned. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (cost
not valid reason for automatically allowing dependent benefits to male Air
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States Supreme Court cases, decided under the federal intermediate standard, overbroad and underbroad classification has
been tolerated only where it was done for the purpose of undoing the effects of past discrimination against women. 57 However, under the strict scrutiny standard, if there is a less
detrimental method available to promote the state's interest, the
use of a suspect classification is unconstitutional. 58 If the Petrie
court is in fact adopting an intermediate standard as the Illinois
strict scrutiny test, a standard of substantial rather than absolute necessity, then the use of a gender-based classification may
be justified to promote the state's interest in undoing past dis59
crimination.
In upholding sex as the only feasible classification which
would promote the state's interest, 60 the court considered but
rejected two alternatives suggested by other courts6 1 to accommodate the state's interest. In an almost incomprehensible passage, the court apparently rejected as impractical the concept of
Force officers while female officers had to prove their husbands were in fact
dependent); Haas v. South Bend Community School Corp., 259 Ind. 515, 289
N.E.2d 495 (1972) (increased cost of administering program insufficient
grounds for excluding girls from athletic competition).
57. Compare Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (allowing women officers to stay longer in rank to compensate for restrictions in other
areas) and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (statute providing tax-exemption for widows but not for widowers compensated for past discrimination) with Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (one year residency
requirement for voters not necessary to promote state interest in preventing fraud) and Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (fifteen year residency requirement for aliens for purposes of welfare eligibility not
necessary to protect state interest).
58. See generally Turkington, Equal Protection of the Laws in Illinois,
25 DEPAUL L. REV. 385 (1975-76); Note, Sex Discriminationin High School
Athletics, 57 MINN. L. REv. 339 (1972-73).
59. See notes 22-29 and accompanying text supra.
60. Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 Ill. App. 3d 980, 990, 394 N.E.2d
855, 863 (1979). The court found the provision of separate teams for girls
necessary because, given the past disparity of opportunity and innate physical differences, boys and girls were not similarly situated as they entered
into most athletic endeavors. The concept of treating alike those who are
similarly situated is often stated as a part of the intermediate standard of
judicial review applied to gender-based classification. See, e.g., Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed, the Court struck down a state statute
which gave preference to men over women when persons of the same entitlement class applied for appointment as administrator of a decedent's estate. The Court said: "A classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.'" Id. at 76, citing Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (emphasis added).
61. Gomes v. Rhode Island Interscholastic League, 469 F. Supp. 659 (D.
R.I.), vacated as moot, 604 F.2d 733 (1st Cir. 1979); Attorney Gen. v. Massachusetts Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, Inc., 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1584, 393
N.E.2d 284 (1979).
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separate but equal teams. 62 Most courts, in defining "separate
but equal," have allowed some variation, such as softball for
girls and baseball for boys. The Petrie court's rationale seemed
to be that, if equal opportunity must be given in a particular
sport, then any variation wquld be impermissible; for example,
since the required skills in baseball and softball differ, the court
would not consider them equal. To achieve true equality, accordingly, it would be necessary to have a girls' and a boys' baseball team, and a girls' and a boys' softball team. Carried to its
extreme, in any sport where there was any variation in rules or
skills, such as lower nets in girls' volleyball than in boys', multiple teams would be necessary. This apparently would lead in
the court's reasoning to the ludicrous result of having four volleyball teams: one for girls and one for boys using a low net, and
one for girls and one for boys using a higher net. This reasoning
is unique to the Petrie court. If one accepts this definition of
separate but equal, however, it is easy to see that such a scheme
would not be feasible. Economic considerations aside, most
schools would not have enough students for all the teams.
Having discarded the alternative of separate but equal
teams, the court turned next to the proposition of establishing a
quota of boys on girls' teams. The court rejected this, based on
Regents of the University of Californiav. Bakke, 63 which it asserted stood for the proposition that an unconstitutional classification cannot be made constitutional by a quota system. Bakke
should not have been relied on to justify rejection of a quota system in the Petrie case. The Petrie court had already decided
that sex classification in athletics was constitutional. 64 Since
the court was not dealing with an unconstitutional classification,
a quota system would have no effect on its constitutionality.
The court concluded that in order to promote equality it was
not necessary to offer boys and girls the opportunity to play exactly the same sports, but rather the opportunity to participate
in "a total athletic program presenting a variety of
choices ....,,65 The court reasoned that since volleyball and
62. Most of the decisions involving exclusion of girls from boys' teams

have indicated that "separate but equal" is a valid alternative. Few have

questioned, as the court did here, the uniqueness of the skills involved.
Compare Leffel v. Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 444 F. Supp.
1117 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (girls need not be allowed to try out for boys' teams
where separate girls' teams with comparable programs are provided) with
Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975) (capable girls may not
be excluded from boys' team regardless of existence of girls' team).
63. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
64. Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 Ill. App. 3d 980, 990, 394 N.E.2d
855, 863 (1979).

65. Id. at 992, 394 N.E.2d at 864, quoting Hoover v. Meicklejohn, 430 F.
Supp. 164, 171 (D. Colo. 1977).
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football are both fall sports, students of both genders were given
equal athletic opportunities through different sports. "Girls...
are given volleyball playing opportunities because they have lit'66
tle if any in football.
The court supported its conclusion by analogy to the statutory scheme in Schlesinger v. Ballard.67 In Ballard, female officers were allowed to remain longer at one rank without being
penalized because they could not go into combat and, hence,
68
could not get the same promotion points available to men.
This analogy is tenuous. Ballard would better support an argument for separate but equal teams or different rules for girls'
sports. The female officers in Ballardwere in the same "game,"
but with a slight variation in rules; they were not completely excluded.
CONCLUSION

It is only in the past ten years that gender-based classifications have been successfully challenged, and only in the past
five that they have been successfully challenged by men. 69 The
Petrie decision is in harmony with decisions of the United
States Supreme Court 70 which may be moving toward a theory
71
of "one-way suspect classification" in sex discrimination cases.
This means that where disparate treatment is directed toward
women the classification is suspect and subject to strict scrutiny, while disparate treatment of males need only be rationally
related to the achievement of state objectives. If, indeed, oneway suspect classification is a reality, rejection of the precedential value of cases dealing with disparate treatment of women, as
66. Petrie v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 75 Ill. App. 3d 980, 992, 394 N.E.2d
855, 864 (1979). This argument borders on a return to sex-stereotyping of
activites, i.e., boys have guns and girls have dolls, boys grow up to be doctors and girls grow up to be nurses.
67. 419 U.S. 498 (1975). This decision, however, has been much criticized
because, while it was upheld as an example of remedying past discrimination against women, the court took little notice of the fact that the "past"
discrimination was still going on. See Ginsburg, Women, Men and the Constitution: Key Supreme Court Rulings, reprinted in WOMEN IN THE COURTS
at 21 (1978).
68. Male officers who were twice passed over for promotion in a ten year
period were subject to mandatory discharge. Female officers were subject

to mandatory discharge for want of promotion after 13 years.
69. Hochfelder, Equal Rights -

Where Are We Now?, 64 ILL. BAR J. 558,

560 (1976).
70. See note 72 infra. See generally Ginsburg, Women, Equality & the
Bakke Case, 4 CIVL LIBERTIES REV. 48 (Nov./Dec. 1977).
71. See Erickson, Kahn, Ballard and Wiesenfeld: A New Equal Protection Test in "Reverse" Sex DiscriminationCases?, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 2
n.3 (1975).
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the Petrie court did, may be necessary in deciding rules which
72
apparently discriminate against men.
The Petrie decision may be yet another example of paternalistic protection of women, preserving the stereotype of the female as weak and inferior.7 3 Such criticism has been leveled at
many of the recent United States Supreme Court decisions purporting to have the benign purpose of redressing past injustice. 74 True affirmative action should result neither in "reverse
discrimination" nor abandonment of the merit principle; rather,
precise fundamental descriptions should be substituted for
gross gender classifications. 75 A principle of non-discrimination,
not special favors or benign classification, is the desirable goal
since adverse consequences have occurred when women as a
76
class were singled out by the law for special treatment.
The logical converse argument is that the judiciary must respond to the needs of particular groups who deserve judicial
protection to overcome past disadvantage. 77 Simple neutrality
has seldom worked in changing discriminatory patterns, and affirmative action plans can more quickly eliminate discrimina78
tion by requiring action in favor of disadvantaged groups.
The Petrie case was one of the first to be brought by a male
under a constitutional provision construed as making gender a
suspect classification. The court was therefore almost without
guidance in reaching its decision. 79 Proponents of the Equal
72. The United States Supreme Court has upheld statutes designed to
compensate women for past discrimination, and the fact that they discriminated against men did not make them constitutionally defective. E.g.,
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (provision allowing women to eliminate additional low-earning years from calculation of retirement benefits
worked directly to remedy part of the effect of past discrimination); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (allowing women officers to stay longer
in grade to compensate for restrictions in other areas); Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351 (1974) (statute providing tax-exemption for widows but not for widowers compensated for past discrimination).
73. See, e.g., Ginsburg, The Need for the Equal Rights Amendment, 59
A.B.A.J. 1013 (1973); Johnson & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law. A
Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675 (1971).
74. Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Benign Classificationin the Context of
Sex, 10 CONN. L. REV. 813, 819-27 (1978).
75. See note 54 supra.
76. For example, in the past, in order to "protect" women from exposure
to knowledge of the evils of society, women were denied the right to practice law or serve on a jury. See generally Hochfelder, Equal Rights - Where
Are We Now?, 64 ILL. B. J. 558 (1976).
77. See generally Turkington, Equal Protection of the Laws in Illinois,
25 DEPAUL L. REV. 385 (1975-76).
78. Comment, ConstitutionalLaw. Ameliorative Sex Classificationand
the Equal Protection Clause, 14 WASHBURN L.J. 127, 130-31 (1975).
79. The equal protection clause of the Illinois Constitution was added
on the floor of the constitutional convention, so there is no committee report
to aid in its interpretation. ILL. ANN. STAT. Const., art. I, § 18 (Smith-Hurd).
Nor is the transcript of the proceedings for the date of passage helpful, as
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Rights Amendment have expressed the hope that gender will
not be a factor in determining the legal rights of men and women, and that any sex classification, whether it favors men or
women, will be disallowed.8 0 If other courts follow the Petrie
lead, and interpret equal rights as being a law for women only,
that hope will not be realized.
Diane I. Jennings

support can be found both for the proposition that the provision was solely
for the protection of women, and that it was meant to avoid discrimination
against either sex. Compare 5 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILL. CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

3675-76 (1970) (proponents of the amendment argue

that courts had interpreted the general equal protection clause in such a
way that gender classifications were common and proper; therefore, the
provision was necessary to guarantee women the same type of equality
granted, for example, to blacks) with id. at 3673 ("It well may abolish many
of the ...
statutes ... set up for the protection of women; and the point is
that women don't want this kind of protection) and id at 3675 ("[T] his does
not set us apart as being discriminatory, it says 'on account of sex.' It does
not say 'women' or 'females.' ").
80. See, e.g., Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution,44 U. CIN. L. REV. 1
(1975).

